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Seger

Abstract: This essay will examine the independence of Ethiopia and Liberia, two states
frequently upheld as the only remaining independent African states during the colonial era.
These two countries remained independent primarily because of the diplomatic regard that
European nations held them, not because of military or geographic factors. The European view
that these countries were legitimate players on the world stage was essential to avoiding outright
conquest. However, these countries failed to achieve “real” independence. They had to sacrifice
territory, succumb to European economic intrusion, and be placed in spheres of influence in
order to remain “independent.” In fact, Liberia was a colony itself in many respects. This essay
concludes by questioning why many Africana researchers refuse to acknowledge the
questionable sovereignty of Ethiopia and Libera.

The “Independence” of Ethiopia and Liberia
While the buildup took centuries, the European conquest of Africa was over in a
lightning fast 15 years. At its end, there were only two African states remaining: Ethiopia and
Liberia. The question of why these two countries survived while so many failed has intrigued
historians since the 19th century. Ethiopia and Liberia are very different nations on opposite sides
of the continent, but there are a number of commonalities between the two. This paper will
analyze the geographical, political, and economic causes behind Ethiopia and Liberia’s
independence as well as examine to what extent these countries were actually independent.
Ethiopia secured its independence at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. Emperor Menelik II led
his troops to victory over a powerful Italian expeditionary force. One of the traditionally popular
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explanations for Ethiopian independence is geography.1 Ethiopia, while prosperous, is a rough
country for foreigners. The deserts of the Somali and Afar borders and the swamps of the Sobat
River protect the highlands from all sides, and Ethiopia proper is among the most mountainous
regions in Africa. The land gives defending armies a significant advantage, making it difficult for
foreign armies to submit the country. Geography played an important role in the Battle of Adwa
itself, where the rough terrain limited the Italy’s ability to deploy its troops and use its superior
technology.2 Menelik’s army held the high ground, giving them the edge to win. The
geographical thesis has been highly criticized in recent decades. Many Africana researchers posit
that the geography thesis reinforces colonial racism.3 It makes it seems that it would be
impossible for Black Africans to defeat White Europeans without the “savage” landscape of
Africa to protect them. Tibebu points out that “Lord Napier’s British expeditionary force reached
Maqdala, the heartland of the geographically ‘inaccessible’ plateau, fought Tewodros II, defeated
him, and pulled out. The Sundanese Mahdists set fire to Gondar. The Italians crossed the
merciless heat of the Ogaden and the “impenetrable plateau of Tigray in their march.”4
Geography was not much of a barrier to many invaders, including the Italians that eventually
defeated them. Thus, it could not be the primary reason why the Ethiopians were able to remain
independent.
Tibebu instead places Ethiopia’s independence with it political structure.5 Ethiopia
possessed a very hierarchical political structure, advanced by European standards. It was headed
by a single leader, the Emperor, with a variety of provincial and feudal rulers underneath him.
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Falola agrees with this, saying that “Menelik engaged the Italian threat by cultivating a united
political front in the provinces.”6 This structure allowed Menelik II to field a large, united army
under his direct command. The unitary structure allowed the Ethiopians to resist foreign
influence. This was supplemented by the Ethiopian acceptance of Christianity. The Ethiopian
Christian Church had been the state religion for 1600 years. It was ingrained in Ethiopian
society. While initially a competitor to the authority of the Ethiopian state, “the Church, many
local chiefs, and the peasantry finally rallied and became a positive influence for national
solidarity.”7 The unity of the Ethiopians stopped Europeans stopped Europeans from using their
divide and conquer strategies. It was a form of early African nationalism. The “advanced”
political structure gave the Ethiopians a degree of legitimacy on the world stage. In addition,
sharing the same general religion (Christianity) made the Europeans more sympathetic towards
the Ethiopians. The Europeans’ view of Ethiopia as a legitimate country was essential in the
country’s independence.8 The influence of Ethiopia allowed it to purchase a huge number of
modern rifles and artillery pieces from Russia and Britain. These weapons set them above other
African states in terms of military capacity. Ethiopia could not have resisted the Italians without
these weapons. After the Ethiopian victory at Adwa, Britain and Russia immediately sent envoys
to recognize Ethiopia. They would not have done this if Ethiopia would not have been seen as a
recognized state by the European community. This was something that other African states did
not have. The political unity, Christian religion, and diplomatic legitimacy helped Ethiopia
survive as a political unit.

6
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The Liberians were in a very different situation than the Ethiopians. Its origins began
across the sea in the United States. Freed slaves and early abolitionists lead the “Back to Africa”
movement, which sought to end slavery by bringing American slaves back to Africa. This
movement resulted in the state of Liberia, founded in 1822 and declared independent in 1847.
Despite being independent of the US, it enjoyed the protection of its mother country.9 According
to Akingbade, the US played an instrumental role in the success of the state. Not only did the US
deter European states from invading the country, the US assisted by aiding the Liberians in
subjugating the native Africans. For example, the Liberians had extensive conflict with the
Grebo people. Early in the colony’s history, a rebellion and embargo from the Grebo was settled
by a US Navy expedition:
In the crisis of 1843, the aid of the United States cruisers was sought in quelling the
rebellion of the Half-Cavalla people, a section of the people, against the Maryland
colony. In 1843, Commodore C. Perry suppressed the resistance of the Grebo and forced
the terms of the settlers upon them. On December 8, 1843, he called a conference of the
settlers and the disgruntled Grebo in order to bring about an amicable and peaceable
settlement of the crisis…He asked the Africans to remove the embargo because it was
injurious and unjust; and that the Grebo chief should promise never again to enter any
combination against the settlers, and should stop hindering any of his people who wished
to hire themselves to the settlers.10
This process was repeated whenever the native Africans would rebel against Liberia. Whenever
tensions would flare, the US would send aid in the form of diplomatic assistance, providing

Harrison Akingbade, “U.S. Liberian Relations During World War II,” Phylon (1960-) 46, no. 1 (1985): 25.
Harrison O. Abingbade, “The Settler-African Conflicts: The Case of the Maryland Colonists and the Grebo 18401900,” The Journal of Negro History 66, no. 2 (1981): 94.
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arms, or direct military confrontation with native Africans. Without this assistance, the native
Africans would have overwhelmed or starved out the Americo-Liberians. They simply did not
have the resources or expertise to survive on their own. In addition, sponsorship by the US was
helpful in securing Liberia’s status as a “proper” country. Like Ethiopia, legitimacy on the world
stage was essential in avoiding outright conquest. The fact that Liberia had a US-style
constitution gave the Europeans less justification in attacking them. Besides being run by Blacks,
it had all the markings of a “civilized” nation.
But in the face of the Great Powers fighting for their influence, what did independence
look like for these countries? Davidson questions the very idea that Ethiopia and Liberia were
independent African states. He called Ethiopia and Liberia “countries which were not colonies,
but which nonetheless failed to win real independence.”11 Firstly, both of them had to make
extensive territorial concessions to surrounding colonies in order to maintain independence.
Ethiopia ceded its entire coastline to Italy, and Liberia lost 40% of its internal claims to Britain
and France.12 Sometimes the territory was given up by treaty; other times, it was taken by force.
These concessions were a huge challenge to their sovereignty. The treaties that the European
powers forced on Liberia and Ethiopia were not always about territory. Many of them
established imperialism in more subtle ways. According to Robertson, in 1906 “Britain, France,
and Italy signed a three-power treaty which defined British and French interests in Ethiopia
respectively as the Blue Nile waters and the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway…Eastern, northern, and
southern Ethiopia became a sphere of Italian economic influence.”13 These three countries each

11
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had their own interests in controlling Ethiopia, but none could overtly conquer it after it was
internationally recognized. So, the Great Powers split it up into their spheres of influence,
jockeying for power in this buffer state. Even though Britain had armed Ethiopia against the
Italians and recognized it shortly after the Battle of Adwa, it conspired to control the critical
Lake Tawa.14 Ethiopia was looked at enviously by all of the countries surrounding it. Liberia
underwent similar experiences in its relationship with the United States. The Americans were
willing to help the Liberians, but it came with a price, which Rosenberg famously called the
“invisible protectorate.”15 The Liberians became dependent on American aid and trade. Liberia
was rich in natural rubber, much of which was exported to the US. In 1916, the Liberian
government was forced to surrender control of its budget to a coalition of America, Germany,
France, and Britain. This was only the start of America’s direct control of Liberia; the American
tire manufacturer Firestone was given extensive land for the world’s largest rubber plantation in
1926. Firestone was among the few foreign governments given access to own Liberian land, and
the company initially only had a 1% tax on its exports.16 It allowed the US to obtain affordable
rubber on their own terms. Before this, the US had to rely on British and Dutch monopolies on
Asian sourced rubber. When Liberia was hit by the Great Depression in the 1930s, the US helped
bail out the government.17 The US would later use its influence in Liberia to fight the Cold War.
America took advantage of the civil wars in order to create an African bulwark against
communism.18 Both Ethiopia and Liberia were well inside the spheres of influence of Western
nations. Was near submission to foreign powers true independence?

14
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For Ethiopia, appeasing the colonial powers also meant adapting to them. After the Battle
of Adwa, Menelik II and his successors launched extensive modernization projects for the
country. In the decades following, a menagerie of foreign advisors was invited into Ethiopia’s
new capital of Addis Ababa in order to bring the country into the 20th century. Railroads,
telegraph lines, and even some power plants sprung up across Ethiopia. This was not only to aid
in the defense of the county—the push for modernization came from one of the prevailing
justifications for imperialism. Tibebu says it best: “Because Ethiopia was way behind in
economic development, it had to ‘open up’ its mountain fastness for modern civilization. If it
could not do so of its own volition, force must be applied. Hence the need for direct colonial
occupation.”19 One of the prevailing thoughts of the time during the 19th century was a strong
belief in the inevitable progress of mankind. Europeans believed that technology and economics
would bring all peoples of the Earth into prosperity. One aspect of this school of thought was that
the African peoples were incapable of becoming a part of this prosperity on their own. Thus, it
was the “White Man’s Burden” to bring these savages into civilization. This was done by taking
over Africans and showing them how to use their extensive resources. If the Ethiopians did not
modernize, the Europeans would have used their “primitive” nature as a cause for war. This was
not popular among all Ethiopians. Many strongly opposed it. But to survive, the Ethiopians had
to Westernize. That is the great irony of imperialism; it forces states to become that which they
oppose in order to survive.
Some historians maintain that Liberia was not an independent African state at all, but a
colony in itself. The comparison is clear: settlers from a Western nation come to Africa to set up
a Western government and impose it on Africans. To a considerable extent, Liberia was a US

19
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colony of sorts. The Americo-Liberians, as they liked to call themselves, were strangers in a
strange land. When they founded the colony, they had little in common with their distant African
relatives. The Americo-Liberians brought with them a US-style constitution and US culture.
While they may have been viewed as Africans in the US, they were essentially Americans in
Africa. They sought domination over the native Africans though trade and treaties. They often
had difficulties with controlling the interior.20 The Americo-Liberians frequently turned to the
US for assistance in dealing with these concerns, such as with the Grebo people. Even though it
was “independent,” it failed to develop an economy which benefitted its people. It closely
resembled the economically underdeveloped economies of surrounding colonies. Just like the
colonies, the infrastructure in Liberia primarily served to extract and export resources, primarily
rubber. According to Davidson, “the World Bank had estimated 1973 that out of every dollar
earned, 16 cents stayed in the country.”21 Davidson blames this on “the continued ambition of
the Americo-Liberian group to keep all power and privilege in their own hands at the cost of the
majority of Liberians.”22 In Liberia, the Americo-Liberians took the same role as White settlers
in South Africa or Kenya. They were the elite of society, and their grip on power would
eventually turn to bloody internal unrest. Like many African colonies, Liberia was rocked by
civils wars in the last quarter of the 20th century. First, the Americo-Liberians fought against the
native African population, then the Africans began endless fighting against each other.
Throughout the wars, the Americo-Liberians retained control over the wealth of the country.
Rosenberg compares the status of Liberia to Latin American states like “Cuba, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti” at the same time, “somewhere between formal
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colonies and full independence.”23 The US became adept at this form of soft imperialism,
especially after the American Civil War. The influence was economically focused rather than
political, which is shown by the American economic dominance in the country. Liberia was not a
survivor of the Scramble for Africa, it was an early victim of it.
The survival of Ethiopia and Liberia was important in the development of Pan-African
identity. It showed that the Europeans were invincible; they could be defeated by Africans. When
Ethiopia was conquered before the Second World War, the heroic resistance of the Ethiopians
and the outpouring of support from the other colonies helped nurture national identities across
the continent of Africa. This is one possible explanation for the persistence of the idea of
Ethiopian and Liberian full independence. Questioning the validity of the theory would question
the foundations of Pan-Africanism. In reality, the status of these two countries was much more
complicated. They had to make huge sacrifices to retain their independence, often compromising
with colonial powers. While nominally independent, the state of Ethiopia and Liberia needs to be
looked at in the context of the time.
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